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Abstract 
This paper aims at a commentary on the Neoclassical Economics as a Method of 
Scientific Research Program which argues that many theories in Neo-Classical 
Economics when tested using Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Program, 
were not categorised as 'progressive research program'. However, some endogenous 
growth theories have now been tested by few researcher as progressive in terms of 
Lakatos’ Scientific Research Program. 
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Neoclassical Economics as a Method 
of Scientific Research Program 
1. Philosophy of Science and Neoclassical Economics: A brief summary 
 
Neoclassical economics and physical sciences have many things in common. 
Both economists and physicists, formulate laws based on their observations. Like 
physicists, economists rely on mathematics to formalize theories that are often 
not constrained by experimental evidence. Like physicists, economists reduce 
complex phenomena to basic units, such as the utility of the rational individual, 
and then explain the complex phenomena in terms of the interaction and 
aggregation of the basic units. However, one of the most important similarities 
is that neoclassical economists frequently justify their discipline, particularly 
their methods, using theories of scientific method devised by philosophers of 
science, especially by philosophers of physics. Traditionally, philosophy of 
science has been closely identified with the philosophy of physics, especially the 
ontological and epistemological issues in the physical sciences2. Moreover, one 
of the more important issues in traditional philosophy of physics is the 
demarcation of science from pseudoscience3. 
 
Philip Mirowski in his book 4 charts the historical development of economics 
vis-a-vis that of physics, especially in terms of the reliance of economics on the 
physical laws of energy conservation. Specifically, he contends that neo classical 
economists patterned the notion of utility after the notion of energy as it arose in 
late nineteenth-century physics. The development of physics, then, served as a 
template for the development of economics as a science. Partially by this means, 
economists laid claim to scientific status for neoclassical economics. Although 
dependence on the physical sciences assisted economists initially in founding 
their discipline, it eventually led to serious problems. Although the perception of 
neoclassical economics as a science by comparing it with physics is changing 
among the new generation of economists today, economists have generally relied 
on various philosophers of science, especially on the philosophers of physics, to 
defend the scientific status of economics. 
                                                 
2 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Ian Hacking, 
Cambridge University Press,1983 
3 Karl Popper, Science as Falsification, Conjectures and Refutations, (1963) 
4 Philip Mirowski, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's Economics, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989 
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Positivism and falsificationism had a profound impact upon economic 
methodology during the mid-twentieth century. For example, Milton Friedman 
wrote a widely referred/debated essay on positive economics5 in the early 1950s. 
Although he does not cite any philosophers of science in the essay, his analysis 
of economic methodology mimics the discussion occurring among these 
philosophers at this period in history. For instance, Friedman claims “positive 
economics is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in precisely the same sense as 
any of the physical sciences”. This objectivity is made possible, according to 
Friedman, through the testing of theoretical claims and predictions—a position 
that weakly but definitely resembles logical positivism/empiricism. But 
Friedman avoids the problems associated with logical positivism/empiricism by 
limiting positive economics on two counts. The first is that of the theoretical 
claims, “Logical completeness and consistency are relevant but play a subsidiary 
role”. The second, and more important, is, “The choice among alternative 
hypotheses equally consistent with the available evidence must to some extent 
be arbitrary, though there is general agreement that relevant considerations are 
suggested by the criteria of simplicity and fruitfulness, themselves notions that 
defy completely objective specification”.  
 
According to Lakatos (1970), scientists gather around a hard core of a research 
programme that is protected from incidental change, by both positive and 
negative heuristic belts. He argued that scientific change is not the result of 
“instant rationality” (i.e., naïve falsificationism,) but generally of protracted 
rational negotiations within the professional community. In place of naïve 
falsificationism, Lakatos substituted a “sophisticated” falsificationism that 
“combines the best elements of voluntarism, pragmatism and the realist theories 
of empirical growth”. 
 
Although some economists have attempted to utilize Lakatos’ scientific 
methodology to defend neoclassical economic method, not much has been 
achieved. As Hausman(1989) notes, “Apart from philosophical difficulties with 
their views, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend have been hard to apply, for they 
are evasive on questions of theory appraisal, which still interest most of those 
writing on economic methodology”6. Caldwell (1982) also claims that Kuhn or 
Lakatos’ methodology may disappoint economists, “who would prefer that 
                                                 
5 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays In Positive Economics, Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3-43 https://campus.fsu.edu/bbcswebdav/orgs/econ_office_org/PowerPoint_Files/2023-
Joe_Calhoun/2023_Chapter_01/Friedman-Essays_in_Positive_Economics.pdf 
6 Daniel M. Hausman , Economic Methodology in a Nutshell, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3,  No.  
2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 115-127  
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methodology offer a rigorous, objective, prescriptive framework”7. Finally, 
Redman (1991) argues that economists have misapplied Lakatos’ notion of 
research programme so as to “obscure and clutter economic thought.”8  
 
The literature on economic methodology is concerned mainly with questions of 
theory confirmation or disconfirmation or empirical theory choice. The central 
question is usually, "How one can tell whether … economics is good science?" 
(Hausman, 1989) Economists would like methodologists to provide the 
algorithm for doing good economic science-and they want the algorithm to 
vindicate their own practice and to reveal the foolishness of those who do 
economics differently. For example, Milton Friedman (1953)9 tells economists 
that good theories are those that provide correct and useful predictions, while 
Paul Samuelson (1947, 1963)10 tells economists to formulate theories with 
"operational" concepts that are, ideally, logically equivalent to their descriptive 
consequences. 
 
Before we analyse Neoclassical Economics as a case study for Lakatos’ 
methodology of Scientific Research Program, it is essential we outline some of 
the basic principles of the concept of Lakatos’Scientific Research Programme in 
the following section. 
 
2. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programme by Imre Lakatos 
 
In this section we will try to understand the demarcation criteria in Lakatos’ 
methodology between scientific and pseudo-scientific research programs. The 
scheme requires a brief exposition of the main elements of Lakatos’ 
methodology and their interpretation, based on Falsification and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. 
 
According to Lakatos’, validation in science involves not individual theories but 
clusters or interconnected theories which may be called scientific research 
programmes. A research programme is essentially a sequence of theories within 
a domain of scientific inquiry. Each later, or successor theory, is held to mark an 
advance over its predecessor.  The move from one theory to its successor within 
a research programme is called a "problem shift." The question of the rationality 
                                                 
7 Bruce J. Caldwell, Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century, Pub: Allen and 
Unwin,  London (1982) 
8 Redman, D. A., Economics and the Philosophy of Science,  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(1991) 
9 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays In Positive Economics, Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3-43  
10 Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard University Press 1947(Enlarged ed., 1983) 
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of changing one's beliefs in science, or how does scientific knowledge "progress" 
over time, is thus transformed - into the question of asking "When is a problem 
shift progressive?" 
 
Problem shifts may be "progressive" in two ways: theoretically or empirically. 
Theoretically progressive problem shifts move towards newer theories that 
enable us to make predictions that are better than its predecessor.  A problem 
shift is empirically progressive if in addition to predicting new observable 
evidence, actual observation confirms new predictions.  For a research 
programme as a whole, to be progressive, each problem shift within a research 
programme must be at least theoretically progressive, and occasionally 
empirically progressive.  In other words, in a progressive programme, each move 
from an old theory to a new must enable us to predict more; also, at least some 
of these predictions must also be confirmed.  A programme that fails to display 
these characteristics is called "degenerating."  A rational scientist should stick 
with a progressive programme and abandon a degenerating programme.11 
                                                                                                                                               
In designing new theories to replace the old, the scientist pursuing a research 
programme adheres to a constellation of beliefs (Kuhn, 1962) which Lakatos 
calls a "heuristic".  This heuristic includes both positive and negative aspects. 
 
The negative heuristic specifies certain claims of the research programme as not 
revisable: "tinkering" with these claims is not permitted as long as one adheres 
to the programme.  They thus rope in a "hard core" which cannot change from 
one theory to the next.  Revising these beliefs is "off limits."  It must be noted 
here, that this premise of Lakatos is analogue to Kuhn's contention that the 
normal scientist accepts a paradigm "dogmatically."12 
The positive heuristic represents a body of beliefs which are allied to the hard 
core as well as suggestions regarding how these beliefs can be revised.  These 
beliefs can be tinkered with; a research programme essentially consists of ‘how 
to reshape these beliefs in the light of potentially refuting observational evidence 
so as to protect the "hard core" from being refuted’.  Thus they form a "protective 
belt" surrounding the hard core.13 
 
                                                 
11Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave,( 1970), Falsiﬁcation and the Methodology of Scientiﬁc Research Programs, Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge. 
 
12 Thomas Kuhn (1962) The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,  
University of Chicago Press, 1962 
13 Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave (ed),( 1970), Falsiﬁcation and the Methodology of Scientiﬁc Research Programs, 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. 
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As a research programme progresses, scientists will attempt to refute or falisify 
the then accepted theory. But when refuting evidence is encountered, according 
to Lakatos, the scientist will not consider the programme as "refuted."  Instead 
he/she will begin to alter the assumptions of the "protective belt" in ways 
permitted or suggested by the positive heuristic, such that the "hard core" of the 
programme can be retained unscathed.  As long as such moves enable scientists 
to predict new phenomena (i.e. it is theoretically progressive), and at least some 
of those predictions get confirmed by observation/empiricism (i.e., intermittently 
empirically progressive), the programme is progressing and it is rational to 
pursue it.14 
 
However, when modifications to the theory only protect the hard core from 
refutation, but do not predict new phenomena, and/or none of those new 
predictions get confirmed by observation, then the programme is degenerating 
and the rational scientist abandons it. 
 
To put it simply, Lakatos identified the conditions which must be met in order 
for it to be heuristically rational to replace an old scientific theory by a new one. 
(1) The new theory must “predict novel facts, that is, facts improbable in the light 
of, or even forbidden, by” the older one; (2) The new theory must explain “the 
previous success” of the older one: it must contain “all the unrefuted content” of 
the latter; (3) “Some of the excess content” of the new theory must be 
corroborated.  If (1) and (2) are satisfied, replacement of the old theory by the 
new is a “theoretically progressive problemshift.” If (3) is also satisfied we have 
an “empirically progressive problemshift.”  
 
Ultimately, the usefulness of any research program is to be judged on its ability 
to explain an increasing number of hitherto unexplained phenomena.’ A 
“progressive” research program, to borrow the terminology of Lakatos, 
possesses an expanding empirical content. Theories within a progressive 
research program are able to explain novel facts or regularities that were 
previously unexplained. Conversely, a “regressive” research program is one 
whose theories require continuous ad hoc changes in order to shore up the 
fundamental axioms upon which they are based. The theories in a regressive 
research program continually confront empirical refutation, and they must be 
amended accordingly.15 
 
                                                 
14 ibid 
15 ibid 
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A research programme is a sequence of theories governed by a set of rules or 
heuristics. Each theory consists of two kinds of statements, those constituting the 
hard core, and those characterising its protective belt. All theories in the sequence 
share a common hard core, while each has a more or less different protective 
belt. The heuristic of the programme consists of a set of rules that govern the 
movements along the sequence. The negative heuristic is the simple proscription 
against revising or rejecting the hard core, while the positive heuristic instructs 
how to modify the protective belt so as to settle tensions between theory and 
empirical evidence while at the same time protecting the hard core. Hence what 
we get is a sequence of theories sharing a hard core and governed by positive 
heuristic for what they do not share, namely the protective belt. 16 
 
2.1 Latsis’ Application of ‘Methodology of Scientific Research Programme’ in 
Neo Classical Economics 
 
In Latsis’s application, the models of perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition belong to the same research programme of situational determinism. 
They are members in the sequence of theories that share hard core assumptions 
such as profit maximization, perfect information, and independent decisions by 
firms. They differ little with regard to their protective belt statements: one 
assumes homogeneous products, while the other assumes product differentiation. 
The positive heuristic of the programme consists of the rules guiding the analysis 
of equilibrium conditions and comparative statics.  
  
On the Methodology of Scientific Research Programme, theories are held to be 
empirically accountable, but empirical evidence is channelled to hit the 
protective belts only, while leaving the hard core intact. Theory modification is 
constrained by empirical evidence, but it is also constrained and guided by the 
tenets of a programme so as to guarantee continuity across theory changes. This 
is hoped to rule out ad hoc modifications. Yet theory modification is a key idea 
in the Methodology of Scientific Research Programme. Empirical accountability 
is not a matter of instant fit between theory and the data; it is rather a matter of 
dynamic empirical performance across the sequence of theories. This is where 
the concept of progress comes in. 
 
The normative appraisal of a programme is in terms of progress. A progressive 
programme is one that exhibits both theoretical progress (it yields a novel 
prediction each time there is a move to another theory along the sequence) and 
empirical progress (those predictions fail to be contradicted by evidence). A 
                                                 
16 ibid 
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degenerating programme is one that fails to exhibit theoretical and empirical 
progress. In Latsis’s application, situational determinism comes out as a 
degenerating programme, since monopolistic competition fails to yield novel 
predictions in the absence of required input data.17 
 
Normative appraisal is essentially comparative. It is comparative in that theory 
versions are to be compared across the sequence within a programme. And it is 
comparative in that a programme being appraised is to be compared to other 
programmes for its relative progressiveness. In principle, degenerating 
programmes should be refuted and replaced by progressive programmes. It is 
well known that Lakatos was unable to solve the difficult problem of setting rules 
for determining the conditions under which such refutation and replacement 
should happen. For how long is a research programme permitted to degenerate 
before being overthrown? The heuristic of a programme would not tell as it is 
only supposed to govern what happens within the programme. In line with this 
inconclusiveness in Lakatos’s framework, Latsis did not rush to radical 
conclusions in his application. He granted that the programme of situational 
determinism may successfully serve as a test bed for the development 
mathematical techniques, and that it can be used for answering certain questions 
that behaviouralism cannot answer. He was thus unwilling to pass final 
judgement in appraising these rival programmes. This was surely understandable 
also due to the young age of the behavioural programme.  
  
In the course of the subsequent years, others published numerous applications of 
the Lakatosian framework, including those to international trade, general 
equilibrium, new classical macro, and to schools of economic thought such as 
Keynesian, Marxian, Austrian, and neo-Ricardian. Few of these studies did what 
the framework recommended doing, namely comparing rival research 
programmes for their relative progressiveness.  
 
In the next section we will discuss the conceptual foundations of Neoclassical 
economics as a case study of Lakatos’ Scientific Research Programme and 
outline the famous Spiro Latsis-Milton Friedman letters/ debate. 
 
3. Milton Friedman and Neoclassical Economics: A case study of Scientific 
Research Programme 
 
                                                 
17 Spiro Latsis, Situational Determinism in Economics, The British Journal for the Philosophy of science, pp 207-
245,1972.  http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/686686?uid=3738256&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21103845472177 
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In 1972, Spiro Latsis published a case study titled ‘Situational Determinism in 
Economics’ in ‘The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science’. The paper 
put forwards the methodology of neoclassical economics as a case study of 
Scientific Research programme (Lakatos, 1970). It accomplished Milton 
Friedman's methodology as 'pseudo-scientific' in terms of Lakatos's evaluative 
philosophy of science. According to Lakatos's methodology, the demarcation 
between scientific and pseudo-scientific theories consists of their ability to 
predict, testable empirical facts. Latsis claimed that Friedman's methodology of 
neoclassical economics had failed this criterion of Lakatos's Scientific Research 
programme and hence cannot be demarcated as scientific.18 According to Latsis, 
Friedman's methodology was what Lakatos termed as ‘degenerating’.  He also 
put forth a program of "economic behaviorism,"19 and went on to organize a 
conference around methodology in economic research programs and his 
criticisms have sparked an ongoing debate over the nature of economic research 
(Latsis, 1972). 
According to situational determinism, the situation in which an agent finds itself 
determines its behaviour. The inner workings of the agent do not matter, as the 
external situation completely constrains its behaviour. The agent’s situation is 
construed so as to leave it with no choice: in a single-exit situation, there is just 
one way to go, so there is no room for genuine choice, decision-making, and 
entrepreneurship. Behaviour becomes a matter of reaction instead of action.  
Latsis argued that situational determinism is a degenerating research programme. 
The model of monopolistic competition as a successor of perfect competition 
within the same programme fails to make theoretical progress even in the sense 
of generating novel predictions. Therefore, a case can be made against situational 
determinism and for an alternative research programme such as economic 
behaviouralism. Unlike situational determinism, economic behaviouralism pays 
serious attention to the psychological and organisational details of the inner 
functioning of economic agents. On this programme, behaviour is not 
determined by the situation alone, but the inner environment of agents becomes 
relevant, and behaviour becomes a matter of genuine decision-making in 
multiple-exit situations. While the programme of situational determinism is 
autonomous with respect to psychology and organisation theory, economic 
behaviouralism is dependent on contributions from these fields of inquiry. 20 
 
                                                 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
20 ibid 
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To quote Latsis, 
“In Friedman's case, one would have to explain why the market 
behaves as if firms wanted to maximise profit etc. These 
unsolved problems of reduction of the hard core to 'more realistic' 
ones do not prevent either the theoretical or the empirical 
progress of the programme. Empirical falsifications coming from 
'indirect' tests do not harm progress either. Anomalies, unsolved 
puzzles can always abound: they only provide economists with 
work in elaborating the protective belt. So far Friedman's position 
is vindicated by Lakatos's methodology. False assumptions may 
be rich in true (and also in false) consequences, and long term 
progress may be founded on an intuitively false hard core. The 
trouble comes only when we appraise the theoretical and 
empirical progress of the programme: the adhocness or non-
adhocness of the adjustments in the ever more complicated 
protective belt. This is, as I tried to show, where the neoclassical 
programme-after a period of initial progress-started failing. 
Friedman never seriously analysed the theoretical adjustments 
made by the neo-classical school (which he openly defends) for 
adhocness.  
Thus the Friedman-Machlup methodology can easily be 
characterised as an attempt to defend a research programme 
against utopian standards of falsificationism. Their only major 
slip in these defensive manoeuvres was Friedman's much 
discussed thesis-christened by Samuelson the 'F-twist'-that 'to be 
important... a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its 
assumptions'. This was nothing more than a blunt and 
provocative formulation of the truism that the hard core of a 
powerful research programme may consist of counter-intuitive 
over-simplifications. The real weakness of this methodology is 
its purely defensive character and its lack of a clear empirical 
criterion of progress.” (Latsis, 1972)21 
 
 
                                                 
21 ibid 
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 3.1 Friedman’s Defence 
In defence, Friedman wrote a 17 page letter to Latsis in December 1972 and 
wrote he has been “talking Progress all the time”22. He counter-claimed that the 
neoclassical monopoly competition model had in fact shown empirical progress 
by predicting phenomena not previously observed and were subsequently 
confirmed by empirical evidence.23 The example he gave was a prediction of 
Chamberlain's monopolistic competition model that "the standard explanation 
for the Standard Oil monopoly was wrong", which he added had been 
theoretically predicted by Aaron Director and empirically confirmed by John S. 
Magee paper ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case’24. In 
particular, Friedman cited the paper that was specifically intended to prove Dr. 
Director's thesis that monopolists always prefer merger to predatory pricing. The 
paper is widely believed to prove that the US government's 1911 breakup of the 
Standard Oil trust as a monopolistic combination hurt rather than benefited 
consumers because prices of oil products were actually lower under the 
efficiencies the trust created. 
Later, Lakatos invited Friedman to submit a discussion note based on his 
December 1972 letter to Latsis for publication in a symposium on the issue of 
the scientific status or not of neoclassical economics, but Friedman never took 
up the invitation.25 
 
3.2 Empirical Findings for and against Friedman’s conclusion 
 
In 1996 Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein uncovered how Standard Oil used 
its dominant position in refining to sell refined oil at a monopoly price, and 
purchase crude at a monopoly price. Magee’s revisionist analysis was heavily 
criticized, for reasons that demonstrate Lakatos' critique was accurate. 
Christopher Leslie (2013)26 showed that Magee’s claim that Standard Oil was 
not priced predatorily was false, and that Magee misread, misinterpreted, and 
ignored evidence. Economists James Dalton and Louis Esposito reexamined the 
trial record, and found it “contains considerable evidence of predatory pricing. 
Simply stated, the record does not support Magee’s conclusion ...” Magee's 
                                                 
22 Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, For and against Method: Including Lakatos's Lectures on Scientific Method and 
the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, Edited by Matteo Motterlini, University Of Chicago Press, 1999 
23 ibid 
24 John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. 1. (Oct., 1958), pp. 137-169  
25 Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, For and against Method: Including Lakatos's Lectures on Scientific Method and 
the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence, Edited by Matteo Motterlini, University Of Chicago Press, 1999 
26 Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing And Recoupment, Columbia Law Review,2013 
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falsification of Standard’s predatory pricing accusation was based on it being 
“logically deficient.” Friedman's claim that Magee "empirically confirmed" 
Aaron Director's "theory" was wrong. Magee's test was logical, not empirical: 
Standards cannot have predatory price.  
 
Three years later, in 1976, Friedman was awarded Nobel Prize in Economics for 
his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and 
theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy. 
Friedman's own predictions of an accelerating rate of inflation due to attempts to 
use expansionary monetary policy in order to attain an unrealistic employment 
target, as described in his Nobel lecture are cited by others as an example of a 
novel phenomenon successfully predicted by neoclassical economics. This 
research ultimately led to a breakdown of the popular belief in economics in the 
mid-20th century that there was a long-run trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation. Robert E. Lucas(1981)27 argued that the Friedman-Phelps model was 
"as clear cut an experimental distinction as macroeconomics is ever likely to 
see". Roger Backhouse28 argued that Friedman and Phelps had predicted novel 
facts that were corroborated by the events of the 1970s. Mark Blaug(1992)29 
argued that Friedman's 1968 paper and its successful prediction of novel facts 
was itself a proof that Friedman's monetarist, neoclassical research programme 
was a progressive research programme.  
 
But recent studies throw some question on the impact of money supply on 1970's 
inflation, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, money 
supply is difficult to identify and foresee, as it is based on vast, disaggregated 
financial data. Something unperceived cannot be used in "rational decisions." 
Empirically, is has been observed that the 1970s oil shocks, output gap, and 
productivity deceleration are more statistically significant than money supply, in 
explaining the era's inflation. For example, a paper by Katrin Assenmacher-
Wesche and Stefan Gerlach (2006)30 that uses data from 1970 to 2003 for Euro 
zone, observed the cost push shocks, in particular import prices and output gaps 
play more significant role in determining inflation compared to quantity-
theoretic variables like money supply, output growth and velocity.31 
                                                 
27 Lucas, Robert, "Tobin and Monetarism: a Review Article," Journal of  
Economic Literature, 29 (June 1981), 558-585. 
28 Roger E. Backhouse, Interpreting Macroeconomics: Explorations in the History of Macroeconomic 
thought, Publisher: Routledge, 1996. 
29 Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics: Or, How Economists Explain, Series: Cambridge Surveys of 
Economic Literature, 1992 
 
30 Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and Stefan Gerlach, Understanding the Link between Money Growth and Inflation 
in the Euro Area, Center for Economic Policy Research http://stefangerlach.com/CEPR-DP5683.pdf 
31 ibid 
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In Lawrence Boland’s piece, “A Critique of Friedman’s Critics” (1979)32, 
Bolandargues that Friedman’s methodology is best understood as a variant of the 
philosophical position known as instrumentalism, and that if Friedman is so 
interpreted; many critiques of his position existent in the economic literature 
miss their mark. 
 
3.3 Other Criticisms on Friedman’s methodological instrumentalism 
 
Caldwell (1980) in his paper, “A Critique of Friedman’s methodological 
instrumentalism”33 attacks Friedman’s essay (1953)34 on some of the following 
grounds. 
 
3.3.1 Friedman postulates: The goal of science is to discover hypothesis that 
predict well. 
 
Cadwell(1980)35 argues that philosophers of science since 1940’s have 
been unanimously rejecting the notion that only goal of science is 
prediction. He adds “once one takes the position that explanation is the 
goal of science, the instrumentalist view of theories and theoretical terms 
is considerably weakened. If science seeks theories that have explanatory 
as well as predictive power, then theories that merely predict well may 
not be satisfactory, and the view that theories are nothing than instruments 
must be rejected.” 
 
3.3.2 Friedman believes: Assumptions are not a locus of testing for theories, 
their realism  does not matter. 
Much of the debates on Friedman’s position are due to this proposition. 
Caldwell questions the use of the term ‘Realism’. He says ‘Realism’ is often 
confused with concepts such as testable, confirmation and truth. Theories 
may be untestable and may seem unrealistic (without any evidence), yet true. 
Similarly, a theory could be testable, realistic, highly confirmed yet false. 
According to Caldwell, use of these terms (like testable, realistic, highly 
                                                 
32 Lawrence A. Boland, A Critique of Friedman’s Critics Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic 
Association, vol. 17(2), pages 503-22, 1979 
33 Caldwell, A Critique of Friedman’s methodological instrumentalism, Southern Economic Journal, Vol.47, No.2, 
PP 366-374 (1980) 
34 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays In Positive Economics, Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3-43 
https://campus.fsu.edu/bbcswebdav/orgs/econ_office_org/PowerPoint_Files/2023-
Joe_Calhoun/2023_Chapter_01/Friedman-Essays_in_Positive_Economics.pdf 
35 Caldwell, A Critique of Friedman’s methodological instrumentalism, Southern Economic Journal, Vol.47, No.2, 
PP 366-374 (1980) 
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confirmed, truth) interchangeably has rendered Friedman’s position all the 
more confusing.  
 
3.4 Hands’ (2001) Criticism of Neo Classical Economists for borrowing Popper-
Kuhn-Lakatos’ methodology 
 
Hands(2001) writes, economists must develop their own metaphors and 
methodology to advance and justify economics as a science. There are certainly 
ample differences between economics and physics and sufficiently unique issues 
in economics and its practice such that economists can develop an economic 
methodology apart from the neoclassical economic methodology that depends 
on the philosophy of physics. Hands(2001) challenges economists to develop a 
foundation for economic methodology not grounded on the methodology of 
logical positivism/empiricism or Popperianism or even on the methodology of 
Kuhn or Lakatos but on a more pluralistic postmodern approach to science. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Recent use of Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programme in 
evaluating Neo Classical Economic theories and Endogenous Growth models 
 
Many of the recent work done by various researchers on this area have applied 
Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research to test the ‘progressiveness’ of 
Endogenous Growth theory. 
 
Mario Pomini (2012)36 studies the emergence of endogenous growth theory from 
the point of view of Lakatosian categories. It uses the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programs proposed by Lakatos (1970) in order to explain why the 
endogenous growth approach was not incorporated into the neo-classical growth 
program until the late 1980s, although the essential features were well known 
during the 1960s. The thesis which results is that the new growth theory may be 
seen in terms of an extension of the neo-classical research programme to 
incorporate theoretical elements which previously fell beyond its scope. Pomini 
says even if the MSRP is not without its critics among economic methodologists 
it remains a useful framework within which to analyse the evolution of economic 
                                                 
36 Mario Pomini, The Neoclassical Endogenous Growth Theory on Retrospect: a Lakatosian Interpretation, Studi e 
Note di Economia, Anno XVII, n. 2-2012, pp. 249-276 
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ideas (for example, Hands 200137). He concludes that the new (endogenous) 
growth theory may be seen in terms of an extension of the neo classical research 
programme in the sense of Lakatos to incorporate theoretical elements which 
previously fell beyond its scope.  
 
Another paper by Michal Brzezinski and & Michal Dzielinskia,(2009)38 suggests 
that by Lakatos's standards, Schumpeterian variant of endogenous growth theory 
is both theoretically and empirically progressive over neoclassical growth 
theory. They criticize Cavusoglu and Tebald’s (2006) paper on Lakatosian 
appraisal of growth theories on three grounds. First, they hold that Cavusoglu 
and Tebaldi do not provide a proper structure of theory comparison in their 
contribution. Second, they argue that Cavusoglu and Tebaldi use an inadequate 
version of Lakatos's appraisal criterion. Third, they show that there are seminal 
endogenous growth models, which predict income convergence among 
countries.  
 
Sandra Silva’s( 2009)39 paper proposes a reflection on evolutionary 
technological change and economic growth theory, which starts from the 
Lakatosian methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) as an 
appraisal criterion. It analyses the confrontation of these evolutionary theories 
with what can be seen as their ‘rival research programme’, the new neoclassical 
growth models. 
 
4. Some Criticisms of Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programme40  
 
While Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programme was touted by 
his followers as an important criteria of ‘demarcation between scientific and 
pseudo-scientific theories, it also created some of the major debates among 
philosophers and neo classical economists at that time. It may be noted that the 
Lakatos’ Methodology was not free of pitfalls. We list some of the following 
criticisms against Lakatos Methodology of Scientific Research Programme 
(Maki, 2008)41:  
  
                                                 
37 Hands, D.W, Reflection without Rules, Cambridge (UK), CambridgeUniversity Press. (2001), 
38 Michal Brzezinski and & Michal Dzielinskia, Is endogenous growth theory degenerating? Another look at Lakatosian 
appraisal of growth theories ,Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 16, issue 3, pages 243-263, 2009  
39Sandra Silva, On evolutionary technological change and economic growth: Lakatos as a starting point for appraisal, 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 111-135,2009 
40 Uskali Maki, Method and appraisal in Economics, 1976-2006. Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 15, 
issue 4, pages 409-423, 2008 
41 ibid 
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i. There is no easily identifiable stable hard core and positive heuristics in 
economic theorizing.  
ii. There is no active generation of novel predictions in economics.  
iii. There is no room in the Methodology of Scientific Research Programme for 
straightforward inductive support by empirical evidence.  
iv. There is no systematic role in the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programme for social institutions and their history.  
v. There is no systematic account in the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programme of how progress in terms of novel predictions connects with the goal 
of approaching truths about the real world. 
 
Lakatos structured his methodology by examining the history of physical 
sciences throughout the last three hundred years. Therefore, all judgments are 
characterised against programmes of physics. That is, an assumption prevails 
without argument that all disciplines must possess the characteristics of physics 
to qualify as scientific. Of course, areas of study such as Marxism and astrology 
would therefore be seen as unscientific because they don’t conform to physical 
principles. Obviously people and societies cannot be examined in the same the 
way one examines a scientific phenomenon; the complexity of living things is 
such that even biology exhibits important differences to that of physics. 
Moreover, theories held within the social sciences effect how people function in 
society.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
So we see that there are many theories in Neo Classical Economics which, when 
tested by various philosophers using Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific 
Research Program, were not able to categorize them as progressive research 
program. Though many of these theories later “predict novel facts, that is facts 
improbable in the light of, or even forbidden, by the older one” (Lakatos,1970). 
Some endogenous growth theories have now been tested by few researcher as 
progressive in terms of Lakatos’ Scientific Research Program. We must not 
forget that Lakatos’ Scientific Research Program too, had its own shortcomings 
and it cannot be considered a gospel, when it comes to testing the 
‘progressiveness’ of a theory. 
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